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Non-local boxes are hypothetical “machines” that give rise to superstrong non-
local correlations, leading to a stronger violation of Bell/CHSH inequalities than
is possible within the framework of quantum mechanics. We show how non-local
boxes can be used to perform any two-party secure computation. We first construct
a protocol for bit commitment and then show how to achieve oblivious transfer using
non-local boxes. Both have been shown to be impossible using quantum mechanics
alone.
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1. Introduction
Consider two parties, Alice (A) and Bob (B), who are not able to communicate but
have access to physical states that they can use to generate joint correlations. The
generation of correlation can be regarded as an experiment in which both parties
decide to measure the state of their system, and the outcomes of their measurements
are given by random variables. Classical as well as quantum theories put limits
on non-local correlations that can be generated between separated sites when no
communication is available. In particular, both classical and quantum theories do
not violate the no-signaling condition of special relativity, i.e. the local choice of
measurements may not lead to observable differences on the other end. The limits
on the strength of correlations generated in the framework of any classical theory
(i.e. a theory based on local hidden variables) are known as Bell inequalities (Bell,
1965). A well-known variant of a Bell inequality is the Clauser, Horne, Shimony &
Holt (1969) (CHSH) inequality, which can be expressed as (van Dam, 2000)
∑
x,y∈{0,1}
Pr(ax ⊕ by = x · y) ≤ 3.
Here, x ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1} denote the choice of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement,
ax ∈ {0, 1} and by ∈ {0, 1} the respective binary outcomes, and ⊕ addition modulo
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2. The theory of quantum mechanics allows the violation of this inequality, but
curiously only up to a maximal value of 2 +
√
2 which is known as Cirel’son’s
bound (Cirel’son, 1980). Since special relativity allows a violation of Cirel’son’s
bound, Popescu & Rohrlich (1994, 1996, 1997) raised the question why nature is not
more “non-local”? That is, why does quantum mechanics not allow for a stronger
violation of the CHSH inequality up to the maximal value of 4? To gain more insight
into this question, they constructed a toy-theory based on so-called non-local boxes.
Each such box takes inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1} from Alice and Bob respectively and
outputs measurement outcomes ax,by such that x ·y = ax⊕ by. Note that Alice and
Bob still cannot use this box to transmit any information. However, since for all x
and y, Pr(ax ⊕ by = x · y) = 1, the above sum equals 4 and thus non-local boxes
lead to a maximum violation of the CHSH inequality.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between nonlocality and cryptog-
raphy. As it has been shown (Lo, 1997; Lo & Chau, 1997, 1998; Mayers, 1996,
1997), classical as well as quantum mechanics do not allow for the construction of
unconditionally secure bit commitment and oblivious transfer without additional
assumptions. Thus it is a fundamental problem to assess whether any theory that
generates correlations renders these cryptographic primitives possible, while simul-
taneously preserving the no-signaling constraint of special relativity. Here, we show
that two parties with access to the primitive of non-local boxes as described above
are indeed able to perform unconditionally secure bit commitment (BC) as well as
one-out-of-two oblivious transfer (1-2 OT).
A bit commitment protocol allows Alice and Bob to perform the following task:
Alice has chosen a bit b, and wants to convince Bob that her choice is made without
revealing the actual value of b. Since Bob is inherently mistrustful, Alice sends
him some piece of evidence that she made up her mind. However, Bob still has
insufficient information to obtain b. Later on, Alice tells Bob her choice b′ and Bob
verifies that Alice is honest (b′ = b) using the piece of evidence from Alice. The
problem of oblivious transfer was introduced by Rabin (1981). The variant of 1-2
OT first appeared in a paper by Even, Goldreich and Lempel (Even et al., 1985)
and also, under a different name, in the well-known paper by Wiesner (1983). 1-2
OT allows Alice and Bob to solve a seemingly uninteresting problem: Alice has
two bits s0 and s1. Bob wants to learn one of them, but does not want to disclose
to Alice which bit he is interested in. However, Bob should also be restricted to
learning only one of Alice’s inputs. It turns out that given 1-2 OT we can perform
any kind of two-party secure computation (Kilian, 1988).
It has been understood for a long time that noisy channels and preshared noisy
correlations are sufficient to implement secure two-party computations, via 1-2 OT.
Kilian (2000) has shown that noisy “cryptogates” (primitives with inputs and out-
puts for each of the two players) can generically be used to implement 1-2 OT. Based
on the techniques of that paper one would expect that non-local boxes would per-
mit 1-2 OT, since they provide some intrinsic noise. This is indeed the case, but for
more subtle reasons, as we shall discuss in the present paper.
We would also like to draw the reader’s attention to the work of van Dam
(2005, 2000), who shows that access to perfect non-local boxes allows Alice and
Bob to perform any kind of distributed computation by transmitting only a single
bit of information. This is even true for slightly less perfect boxes achieving weaker
correlations (Brassard et al., 2005).
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(a) Related Work
Recently Wolf & Wullschleger (2005) suggested that 1-2 OT can be constructed
using one non-local box alone. However, their version of 1-2 OT implicitly assumes
that the non-local box acts as a kind of cryptogate: either the box has to wait until
both players provide their input before it produces output, or its use is timed in the
sense that the protocol will demand an input at a certain moment, and if a player
does not supply one, uses a standard input instead (say, 0). Notice that the first
possibility runs somewhat counter to the spirit of non-local boxes, as it would allow
signaling by delaying or not delaying an input. Non-local boxes, however, cannot be
used to signal. That this assumption of synchronous input/usage of the box is vital
to the result of Wolf and Wullschleger can easily be seen: without this assumption,
Bob can delay his choice of the selection bit indefinitely by simply deferring his use
of the non-local box. This makes an important difference in reductions to 1-2 OT.
Consider for example the standard reduction of OT to 1-2 OT (see Section 2(b)
for definitions): The sender uses inputs sk = b and sk¯ = 0 with k ∈R {0, 1}. The
receiver uses input c ∈ {0, 1}. The players now perform 1-2 OT(s0, s1)(c) after which
the receiver holds sc. Then the sender announces k. If k = c, the receiver succeeds
in retrieving b and otherwise he learns nothing. This happens with probability
p = 1/2 and thus we have constructed OT from one instance of 1-2 OT. Clearly,
this reduction fails if we use 1-2 OT based on the type of boxes suggested in (Wolf &
Wullschleger, 2005). The receiver simply waits for the announcement of k to retrieve
b with probability p = 1. This was noticed independently by Gisin, Popescu & Short
(2005). However, the protocol of Wolf and Wullschleger forms a useful basis for our
construction of 1-2 OT in Section 4.
(b) This Work
Here, we demonstrate how to circumvent the problem of delay and construct
a protocol for bit commitment and 1-2 OT based on non-local boxes. This shows
that superstrong non-local correlations in the form of non-local boxes enable us to
solve cryptographic problems otherwise known to be impossible. Our work therefore
creates a link between cryptographic problems and the nature of non-locality. In
particular, our result implies that the no-signaling principle and secure computation
are compatible in principle.
(c) Outline
Notation and definitions are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 presents a pro-
tocol for bit commitment based on non-local boxes. Finally, in Section 4, we show
how to obtain 1-2 OT using the same type of boxes.
2. Preliminaries
(a) Notation
Throughout this text, we say “Alice picks x” if Alice chooses x independently
at random from the uniform distribution over all strings of a certain length. We
write [n] for {1, . . . , n}, and y ∈R S if y is chosen uniformly at random from
Article submitted to Royal Society
4 H. Buhrman, M. Christandl, F. Unger, S. Wehner and A. Winter
S. In addition, we use x · y to denote the inner product ∑i=1,...,n xi · yi mod 2
between strings x = x1 . . . xn and y = y1 . . . yn from {0, 1}n. Furthermore, for
strings x ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}∗ we define | · |11 recursively: For the empty word ǫ define
|ǫ|11 = 0. For a, b ∈ {0, 1} and strings x ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}∗ define |abx|11 = |x|11+1
if ab = 11 and |abx|11 = |x|11 otherwise. Informally, for strings x of even length,
|x|11 is the number of substrings “11” in x starting at an odd position.
(b) Model and Definitions
Throughout this text, we call the participant in a protocol honest if he follows
the protocol. Since we are only interested in the case of unconditional security, a
dishonest participant is not restricted in any way. In particular, he may lie about
his own input, deviate from the protocol, or even abort the protocol completely.
(i) Non-local Boxes
A non-local box (NL Box), sometimes also referred to as Popescu-Rohrlich box,
can be seen as a two-party primitive, generating correlations (Popescu & Rohrlich,
1994).
Definition 1. A non-local box (NL Box) is a two-party primitive between Alice and
Bob, in which Alice can input a bit x ∈ {0, 1} and obtains an outcome a ∈ {0, 1}
and Bob can input y ∈ {0, 1} and obtains outcome b ∈ {0, 1} such that the following
holds:
• Once Alice inputs x ∈ {0, 1}, she instantaneously receives outcome a ∈ {0, 1},
• Once Bob inputs y ∈ {0, 1}, he instantaneously receives outcome b ∈ {0, 1},
such that x · y = a⊕ b. Further, we demand that for all c1, c2, c3 ∈ {0, 1}
Pr[a = c1|x = c2, y = c3] = Pr[b = c1|x = c2, y = c3] = 1/2.
Observe that the last condition implies that these boxes cannot be used to signal,
because the outcome of a is independent of x and y and also b is independent
of x and y. It is worth mentioning that specifying the statistics of the primitive
as we did, and disregarding the fact that outputs are obtained immediately after
giving a local input, a non-local box is simply a special bidirectional channel, as
proposed by Shannon (1960). Of course, in general such channels cannot give an
output immediately without having both inputs; non-local boxes can, because they
have no signaling capacity. Observe furthermore that the behaviour described in
the definition parallels quantum mechanical experiments on entangled states: the
outcomes are correlated in a way reflecting the measurement settings, but each
experimenter obtains his outputs immediately.
Note that both Alice and Bob can wait indefinitely before providing their input
to the NL Box. Once they use the box, however, they will only obtain an outcome
in accordance with the condition given above. We say that Alice or Bob delay the
use of their box, if they wait longer than a given protocol dictates before providing
their input to the NL Box.
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(ii) Bit Commitment
Bit commitment is a well known cryptographic primitive that plays an important
role in many other cryptographic protocols. It is defined as follows:
Definition 2. Bit commitment (BC) is a two-party protocol between Alice (the
committer) and Bob (the verifier), which consists of two stages, the committing and
the revealing stage, and a final declaration stage in which Bob declares “accept” or
“reject”. The following requirements should hold:
• (Correctness) If both Alice and Bob are honest, then before the committing
stage Alice decides on a bit c. Alice’s protocol depends on c and any random-
ness used. At the revealing stage, Alice reveals to Bob the committed bit c.
Bob accepts.
• (Binding) Assume (a possibly dishonest) Alice wants to reveal bit c′. Then
always
Pr[Bob accepts | Alice reveals c′ = 0] +
Pr[Bob accepts | Alice reveals c′ = 1] ≤ 1.
• (Concealing) If Alice is honest, Bob does not learn anything about c before the
revealing stage.
We say that Alice cheats if she chooses a bit c′ only after the committing stage
and tries to get Bob to accept c′ during the revealing stage. We also say that Alice
cheats successfully, if Bob accepts the chosen c′. Furthermore, we say that Bob
cheats if he tries to obtain c before the revealing stage. Bob cheats successfully
if he obtains the correct c before the revealing stage. Note that our protocol for
bit commitment is probabilistic and thus achieves statistical security for a security
parameter n. The sum of acceptance probabilities in the binding condition only
needs to be smaller than 1 + εn for some 0 ≤ ε < 1. Likewise, the probability that
Bob correctly guesses bit c before the revealing stage is p ≤ 1/2 + (ε′)n for some
0 ≤ ε′ < 1. By choosing n large we can get arbitrarily close to the ideal scenario.
(iii) Oblivious Transfer
Different versions of oblivious transfer exist in the literature. Here, we will be
concerned with one of the most simple forms of oblivious transfer, namely 1-2 OT.
Definition 3. One-out-of-two oblivious transfer (1-2 OT(s0, s1)(c)) is a two-party
protocol between Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver), such that the following
holds:
• (Correctness) If both Alice and Bob are honest, the protocol depends on Alice’s
two input bits s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1} and Bob’s input bit c ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the
protocol Bob knows sc.
• (Security against Alice) If Bob is honest, Alice does not learn c.
• (Security against Bob) If Alice is honest, Bob does not learn anything about
sc¯.
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Again, our protocol is probabilistic and achieves statistical security for a security
parameter n. The probability that Bob learns sc¯ is p ≤ εn for some ε < 1. Similarly,
the probability that Alice correctly guesses c is upper bounded by 1/2 + (ε′)n for
some 0 ≤ ε′ < 1.
As we saw in Section 1(a), the fact that Alice and Bob can wait before using an
NL Box can have an effect on cryptographic reductions. In our example, we made
use of the most simple form of oblivious transfer, i.e. an erasure channel.
Definition 4. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a two-party protocol between Alice (the
sender) and Bob (the receiver), such that the following holds:
• (Correctness) If both Alice and Bob are honest, the protocol depends on Alice’s
input bit b ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the protocol, Bob obtains b with probability
1/2 and knows whether he obtained b or not.
• (Security against Alice) If Bob is honest, Alice does not learn whether Bob
obtained b.
• (Security against Bob) If Alice is honest, Bob’s probability of learning bit b
does not exceed 1/2.
3. BC from NL Boxes
We now give a bit commitment protocol based on NL Boxes. Our protocol consists
of k blocks. In each block the parties use 2n + 1 shared non-local boxes. We later
fix the security parameter n such that we achieve sufficient security against Bob.
Protocol 1: 1-NLBC(c) One Block
1-commit(c)
• Alice wants to commit to bit c. She encodes c into a string x: She chooses
x ∈ {0, 1}2n+1 by randomly choosing the first 2n bits and then choosing
x2n+1 ∈ {0, 1} such that |x1 . . . x2n|11 + x2n+1 + c is even.
• Alice puts the bits x1, x2, . . . , x2n+1 into the boxes 1, 2, . . . , 2n+ 1. Let
a1, a2, . . . , a2n+1 be Alice’s output bits from the boxes.
• Alice computes the parity of all these output bits A = ⊕2n+1i=0 ai and sends
A to Bob.
• Bob randomly chooses a string y ∈R {0, 1}
2n+1 and puts the bits
y1, y2, . . . , y2n+1 into his boxes. We call the output bits from his boxes
b1, b2, . . . , b2n+1.
1-reveal(c)
• Alice sends c, her string x and all her 2n+ 1 output bits to Bob.
• Bob checks if Alice’s data is consistent: ∀i ∈ {0, 1}2n+1, xi · yi = ai ⊕ bi
and |x1 . . . x2n|11 + x2n+1 + c is even. If not, he accuses her of cheating.
Define C(x) to be the bit which is encoded by x. If Alice is honest, C(x) = c.
It will be clear from our analysis in Section 3(a), that if Alice cheats in one block
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of the protocol Bob will notice this in the revealing stage with probability 1/4. To
increase this probability, we can run many rounds of this protocol.
Protocol 2: NLBC(c) The Full Protocol
commit(c)
Alice wants to commit to bit c. Then Alice and Bob run k times 1-commit(c)
of 1-NLBC(c).
reveal(c)
Alice and Bob run k times 1-reveal(c) of 1-NLBC(c).
If Alice and Bob run the full protocol NLBC(c) with k rounds, then the prob-
ability that Bob catches a cheating Alice becomes larger. In fact, in a k block
protocol, the probability that Alice can cheat successfully is ≤ (3/4)k. Even though
Bob learns a little bit about the committed bit c in each block, we show below that
the amount of information he learns about c can be made arbitrarily small.
(a) Security against Alice
Let us first analyze the security against a cheating Alice for one block only. We
show that no matter which cheating strategy Alice uses, she is always detected with
probability at least 1/4. There are two cases for Alice’s cheating strategy:
1. She has input something into all her boxes after the committing stage. If she
wants to reveal a bit different from C(x) (for the originally chosen x), she
needs to change at least one of her xi. If she does not change the corresponding
output bit ai and if Bob had input yi = 1 she will be caught. Similarly,
if she changes ai but Bob had input yi = 0 she will be caught. Because
Pr[yi = 1] = Pr[yi = 0] = 1/2 she is detected with probability at least 1/2.
2. Alice delays her input to some boxes after the committing stage. Without loss
of generality we can assume that all boxes have inputs before the revealing
stage. Otherwise, Alice’s strategy is equivalent to giving a random input and
disregarding both input and output.
Suppose Alice sends bit A′ to Bob in the committing stage, pretending it
was the parity of her ai’s. She now wants to reveal. Since the outputs of her
delayed boxes are completely random to her, with probability 1/2, the parity
of all ai’s will be different from A
′. Thus, in this case she has to change at
least one ai. But if yi = 0 (yi = 1) and Alice does (does not) change xi,
she is caught. Thus, Alice’s cheating is detected with probability at least 1/4.
We now show that there is a cheating strategy for Alice, such that she is
only detected with probability 1/4, if at least 3 boxes are used per block: She
first sends a random bit A to Bob in the committing stage and does not input
anything into her boxes. In the revealing stage she chooses x ∈ {00}{0, 1}2n−1
with C(x) = c′, where c′ is the bit she wants to reveal. Then she puts the xi’s
into her boxes. With probability 1/2 the parity of the outputs ai from the
boxes is equal to A. Then she is lucky and proceeds with the protocol as she
was supposed to. If not she flips the bits x1 and a1 and then goes on with the
protocol as normal. Now, the parity of the output bits is indeed equal to the
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A she sent before and the x-string still encodes c′. The changes are detected
by Bob iff y1 = 0. If Bob is honest we have Pr[y1 = 0] = 1/2. Thus, a cheating
Alice, using the above strategy, is detected by an honest Bob with probability
1/4.
Now, assume that Alice and Bob run a k-block protocol. Note that Alice may
employ a different strategy (1 or 2, see above) for each block. Assume that Alice
employs strategy 2 in k∗ blocks and that she employs strategy 1 in k − k∗ blocks.
For strategy 1: She commits to 1 in k1 blocks and to 0 in k0 = k − k∗ − k1 blocks,
where k1 ≤ k−k∗. Then security against Alice as in Definition 2 follows by proving
that the following is close to 1:
Pr[Bob accepts | Alice reveals c′ = 0] + Pr[Bob accepts | Alice reveals c′ = 1]
≤ (1/2)k1(3/4)k∗ + (1/2)k0(3/4)k∗
= (3/4)k∗(1/2)k0
(
1 + (1/2)k1−k0
)
.
Without loss of generality we can assume k1 ≥ k0. Then 1 + (1/2)k1−k0 ≤ 2. Thus,
if k∗ > 2 or k0 > 0 the last expression is certainly less or equal to 1. For k∗ ≤ 2 and
k0 = 0 the expression is upper bounded by 1 + (1/2)
k−2, which is in accordance
with Definition 2.
(b) Security against Bob
Let us now analyze the security against a cheating Bob. We first want to prove
that Bob cannot learn too much in one block. Bob can base his guess for c on
the output of his boxes and the bit A he receives from Alice. Note that after Bob
has received the bit A, he learns the inner product of x and y, because: x · y =⊕2n+1
i=1 xi · yi =
⊕2n+1
i=1 ai ⊕ bi = A⊕
⊕2n+1
i=1 bi.
We want to argue that this is all Bob learns about x (and therefore c). In
the trivial case y = 02n+1 it is easy to see that Bob learns nothing, because his
output bits bi are uniformly random and the bit A he receives does not contain
any information since A =
⊕2n+1
i bi. For that reason we will not consider the case
y = 02n+1 in our further analysis.
Assume now Bob chooses y ∈ {0, 1}2n+1\{0}2n+1. Furthermore, assume that
Alice and Bob follow the above protocol, but this time Alice does not commit to a
bit but rather chooses a uniformly random string x ∈ {0, 1}2n+1 . First note that
as above Bob still learns x ·y. Since |{x : x ·y = 1}| = |{x : x ·y = 0}|, x ·y contains
exactly one bit of information about x. But also, since the boxes are non-signaling
and Alice only sends one bit, Bob can learn at most one bit of information about x.
Therefore, the only thing Bob learns about x is x ·y. Since in this changed protocol
Bob learns precisely x ·y, also in the original protocol Bob learns precisely x ·y and
nothing else.
The following lemma can be used to upper bound Bob’s information gain in one
block, by proving that x · y (Bob’s only information about Alice’s commitment) is
always almost uniformly distributed.
Lemma 3.1. Assume Alice and Bob execute one block of the protocol with 2n+ 1
NL Boxes, where Bob chooses some y ∈ {0, 1}2n+1\{0}2n+1 and Alice commits to
some c ∈ {0, 1}. Then the probability for x · y = c, averaged over all x ∈ C−1(c),
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obeys ∣∣∣∣ Pr
x,C(x)=c
[x · y = c]− 1/2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/2n+1.
Proof. We write pcy as a shorthand for Prx,C(x)=c[x·y = c]. The proof is by induction
on n. For n = 0 the statement is easily seen to be true. Assume now n > 0. Let
y1, y2 be the first two bits of y and y
′ the rest, i.e. y = y1y2y
′. To explain the
argument, let us for instance look at the case y1y2 = 01. For any x
′ ∈ {0, 1}2n−1
we have C(x′)⊕ (x1 · y1)⊕ (x2 · y2) = C(x1x2x′) if x1x2 ∈ {00, 10, 11} and we have
C(x′)⊕ (x1 · y1)⊕ (x2 · y2) = C(x1x2x′) if x1x2 = 01. This observation yields
pc01y′ = Pr[x1x2 ∈ {00, 10, 11}]pcy′ + Pr[x1x2 = 01]pc¯y′ = 1/2 + 1/4(pcy′ − pc¯y′),
where we used in the second equality Pr[x1x2 = x
′
1x
′
2] = 1/4 for any x
′
1x
′
2 and
pcy′ + p
c¯
y′ = 1 for y
′ 6= 02n−1. By the inductive assumption ∣∣pcy′ − pc¯y′∣∣ ≤ 2−n+1 and
thus |pc01y′ − 1/2| ≤ 2−(n+1). In the other cases for y1y2 we get
pc00y′ = Pr[x1x2 ∈ {00, 10, 01}]pcy′ + Pr[x1x2 = 11]pc¯y′
pc10y′ = Pr[x1x2 ∈ {00, 01, 11}]pcy′ + Pr[x1x2 = 10]pc¯y′
pc11y′ = Pr[x1x2 = 00]p
c
y′ + Pr[x1x2 ∈ {01, 10, 11}]pc¯y′,
from which the bound follows by the same argument as above.
We now analyze a k-block protocol, where for simplicity k is even. We only consider
the case where Alice commits to c = 0 and c = 1 each with probability 1/2.
Lemma 3.2. Assume Alice and Bob run a k-block protocol in which in each block
2n+ 1 boxes are used. Then the probability that Bob can guess the committed bit
correctly is upper bounded by 1/2 + k/2n+1.
Proof. Let ri be Bob’s best guess for c using only x · y from the i-th block. Set ǫi
such that 1/2 + ǫi = Pr[c = ri]. By Lemma 3.1, 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2n+1. Note that Bob’s
only information about c is r1, . . . , rk.
Let us think of the process of how ri is obtained in a way which is easier to
analyze but equivalent to the original: With probability 1 − 2ǫi (a) the bit ri is
chosen randomly from {0, 1} and with probability 2ǫi (b) ri is set to c.
By the union bound the probability that at least once during the k blocks case
(b) occurs is at most
∑k
i=1 2ǫi ≤ k/2n. Thus, with probability at least 1 − k/2n
the bits r1, . . . , rk are completely random. Bob’s probability of guessing correctly
is upper bounded by 1/2(1− k/2n) + k/2n = 1/2 + k/2n+1.
Note that the analysis in Lemma 3.2 is not tight, but sufficient for our purposes.
4. 1-2 OT from NL Boxes
We now show how to construct 1-2 OT from NL Boxes. We thereby assume that
Alice and Bob have access to a secure bit commitment scheme BC as given in Sec-
tion 3 for sufficiently large k. Our protocol extends the protocol suggested by Wolf &
Wullschleger (2005) and uses an idea presented in the context of quantum oblivious
transfer by Cre´peau (1987, 1994) and Cre´peau & Kilian (1988).
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(a) Protocol
Before presenting the actual protocol, we briefly discuss the intuition behind it.
The rough idea is that using NL Boxes, we can approximate an erasure channel
from Alice and Bob: Suppose Alice has input v ∈ {0, 1}. She picks y ∈R {0, 1},
sets ry = v and picks ry¯ ∈R {0, 1}. If Alice inputs x = r0 ⊕ r1 and Bob inputs
y′ ∈R {0, 1} to an NL Box they will obtain outputs a and b with a ⊕ b = x · y′. If
Alice now sends m = r0 ⊕ a to Bob, Bob will obtain ry′ by computing m ⊕ b =
r0⊕a⊕b = r0⊕(r0⊕r1)y′ = ry′ . He cannot obtain more than one bit of information,
as he receives only one bit of communication from Alice. Now Alice announces y to
Bob. If y = y′, Bob received Alice’s input bit ry′ = v. This happens with probability
1/2. The only trick we need, is to make sure Bob actually did use the NL Box and
made his choice of y′ before Alice’s announcement. To achieve this, bit commitment
is used in step 2.
Protocol 3: 1-2 NLOT(s0, s1)(c)
1: For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n:
• Alice picks r0,i, r1,i ∈R {0, 1}.
• Bob picks y′i ∈R {0, 1}.
• Alice and Bob use one NL Box with inputs xi = r0,i⊕ r1,i and y
′
i respec-
tively. Alice gets ai, Bob bi.
2: For 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
• Alice and Bob run commit(y′i),commit(bi),commit(y
′
i+n),commit(bi+n),
where Bob is the sender.
• Alice picks ki ∈R {0, 1}, and announces it to Bob.
• Alice and Bob run reveal(y′i+kin) and reveal(b
′
i+kin
), where Bob is the
sender.
• Alice checks that xi+kin · y
′
i+kin
= ai+kin ⊕ bi+kin and otherwise aborts
the protocol.
• Alice sets r0,i ← r0,i+k¯in, r1,i ← r1,i+k¯in and ai ← ai+k¯in. Bob sets
bi ← bi+k¯in and y
′
i ← y
′
i+k¯in
.
3: For 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
• Alice sends mi = r0,i ⊕ ai to Bob.
• Bob computes v′i = mi ⊕ bi = ry′
i
,i.
• Alice picks yi ∈R {0, 1}, sets vi = ryi,i and announces yi to Bob.
4: Bob picks J0, J1 ⊂ [n], subject to |J0| = |J1| = n/3, J0 ∩ J1 = ∅ and ∀i ∈ Jc,
yi = y
′
i. He announces J0, J1 to Alice.
5: Alice receives J0, J1, checks that J0∩J1 = ∅ and otherwise aborts the protocol.
She computes sˆ0 = s0⊕
⊕
j∈J0
vj and sˆ1 = s1⊕
⊕
j∈J1
vj . She announces sˆ0,sˆ1
to Bob.
6: Bob now computes sc = sˆc ⊕
⊕
i∈Jc
v′i.
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(b) Correctness
We first need to show that if both parties are honest, Bob succeeds in retrieving
sc with high probability. Note that Bob can retrieve sc, if he can construct a set
Jc ⊂ [n] with |Jc| = n/3 where ∀i ∈ Jc, yi = y′i, since only then ∀i ∈ Jc, vi = v′i and
he can compute
sˆc ⊕
⊕
i∈Jc
v′i = s0 ⊕
⊕
j∈Jc
vj ⊕
⊕
i∈Jc
v′j = sc.
We are thus interested in the probability of Bob constructing such a set successfully.
Let Xi be the random variable such that Xi = yi ⊕ y′i. Note that since Alice and
Bob choose yi and y
′
i independently uniformly at random, the random variable
Sn =
∑n
i=1Xi is binomially distributed. From Hoeffding’s inequality (Hoeffding,
1963) we obtain
Pr
(
Sn − n
2
≥ ε
)
≤ e− 2ε
2
n . (4.1)
Then,
Pr(Bob gets sc) = Pr
(
#{i|yi = y′i} ≥
n
3
)
= 1− Pr
(
#{i|yi = y′i} <
n
3
)
= 1− Pr
(
Sn >
2n
3
)
≥ 1− Pr
(
Sn − n
2
≥ n
6
)
≥ 1− e− n18 ,
where the last inequality comes from equation (4.1). Thus the probability of Bob
failing is exponentially small in n.
(c) Security against Alice
Suppose that Bob is honest, but Alice tries to learn c. As outlined in Section 2,
NL Boxes do not allow signaling and therefore Alice learns nothing during step 1 of
the protocol. Due to the concealing properties of the bit commitment scheme, Alice’s
information gain in step 2 is negligible for a sufficiently large security parameter k.
Thus the only time she receives information from Bob is during step 4. Note that
Bob picks y′i independently of yi. Alice has no information on y
′
i. This means that
the elements of the sets J0 and J1 are independent of c from Alice’s point of view:
their composition depends only on whether y′i = yi for a given i. Alice thus learns
nothing from observing the sets J0 and J1.
Note that Alice gains nothing from trying to delay her own boxes: By delaying
boxes in the commitment protocol employed in step 2, she will only remain more
ignorant about Bob’s commitment. Furthermore, each round i in step 1 corresponds
to Alice using an erasure channel with input vi = ryi,i, because the following two
conditions are satisfied: step 2 ensures us that Bob uses this channel, and, since Al-
ice sends yi to Bob during step 3, Bob knows whether he obtained vi. The situation
where Alice delays using the boxes is equivalent to using the channel with a ran-
domly chosen input and gives her no additional advantage. Since we can construct
Article submitted to Royal Society
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an erasure channel, we thus obtain an 1-2 OT via the above construction (Cre´peau,
1987).
(d) Security against Bob
Now suppose that Alice is honest, but Bob tries to learn more than sc. We now
show that Bob can retrieve exactly one of the bits s0, s1. In particular, we show
that he cannot compute any function f of s0 and s1 which depends on both input
bits.†
Because Alice is honest, all vi are independent. Furthermore, since the sets J0
and J1 are disjoint, it follows that r = ⊕j∈J0vj and r′ = ⊕j∈J1vj are independent.
All Bob receives from Alice is sˆ0 = s0 + r and sˆ1 = s1 + r
′. Thus, in order to
compute any function f of s0, s1 which depends on both input bits, Bob needs to
learn both r and r′. Bob will only obtain r and r′ and then also learn more than
one of the bits s0, s1, if he succeeds in creating two sets J0, J1 ⊂ [n] with J0∩J1 = ∅
and |J0| = |J1| = n/3 such that ∀i ∈ J0 ∪ J1, yi = y′i. We are therefore interested
in the probability that Bob can successfully construct two such sets.
In order to construct such sets, Bob may try to delay using some of the NL
Boxes during step 1. This will enable him to wait for the announcement in step 3,
to force yi = y
′
i and obtain vyi with certainty. By assumption, the bit commitment
scheme is binding for sufficiently large k and thus Bob cannot try to fool Alice by
breaking the commitment itself. However, he can try to commit to random values
and escape detection during step 2. In particular, he can choose to be honest in step
1 for exactly one NL Box in runs i and n+ i. Without loss of generality, suppose he
was honest in run n+ i and delayed use of the box in run i. He then commits once
to the outcome of the honest box, and once to y′i = 1 and a random bi ∈R {0, 1}.
The probability that Alice challenges him on the box he has been honest with
in step 1 is 1/2. Then he has succeeded to cheat on one of the bits, y′i, and will
obtain vyi with certainty. However, with probability 1/2 Alice will challenge him
on the other NL Box. In this case he can escape detection with probability 1/2:
He announces y′i and bi and hopes that this matches the input of Alice’s box. He
will have committed to the correct bi with probability 1/2 and then he escapes
detection. Thus the total probability of cheating successfully on one of the bits is
given by 1/2 + (1/2)(1/2) = 3/4. Let C ⊆ [n] with k = |C|, 0 ≤ k ≤ n denote the
set of indices on which Bob tries to deceive Alice. He will remain undetected with
probability
Pr(Bob successfully cheats on k bits) =
(
3
4
)k
.
Suppose now, that Bob successfully cheated on k bits. We are then interested in
bounding the probability of constructing two valid sets if Bob already has k valid
entries. Note that we now only consider the probability of achieving yi = y
′
i for
† A function f depends on the j-th input argument if there is an input to f such that changing
the j-th argument changes the value of f .
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indices i /∈ C and then #{i|yi = y′i} = (n− k)− Sn−k. For k < n,
Pr(Bob gets s0 and s1) =
(
3
4
)k
Pr
(
#{i|yi = y′i} ≥
2n
3
− k
)
≤
(
3
4
)k
Pr
(
Sn−k ≤ n
3
)
=
(
3
4
)k
Pr
(
n− k
2
− Sn−k ≥ n− 3k
6
)
≤
(
3
4
)k
e
−2
(
(n−3k)2
18(n−k)
)
If k = n, Bob will be caught with probability (3/4)n. Thus the probability of Bob
deceiving Alice can be made arbitrarily small by choosing n large.
5. Conclusion
We have shown how to obtain protocols for bit commitment and one-out-of-two
oblivious transfer given access to non-local boxes. This creates a link between cryp-
tographic problems, which may appear very artificial, and non-local correlations: If
such NL Boxes were available in nature, we could implement these cryptographic
protocols securely which is known to be impossible to achieve using quantum me-
chanics alone.
Interestingly, the quantum mechanical impossibility proofs for bit commitment
and coin tossing (Lo & Chau, 1997, 1998; Mayers, 1996, 1997; Lo, 1997) via the
so-called EPR-attack are the quantum version of delaying the input. One may want
to go back to explore why we could circumvent this attack here, and the reason
seems to be that the NL Box is more like a quantum mechanical entangled state
together with an encasing experimental setup, which enforces that the particles can
only be measured separately. In contrast, for the EPR-attack to work, Alice has to
be able to perform arbitrary collective operations on her qubits.
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